We propose a truthful-in-expectation, (1 − 1/e)-approximation mechanism for a strategic variant of the generalized assignment problem (GAP). In GAP, a set of items has to be optimally assigned to a set of bins without exceeding the capacity of any singular bin. In the strategic variant of the problem we study, values for assigning items to bins are the private information of bidders and the mechanism should provide bidders with incentives to truthfully report their values. The approximation ratio of the mechanism is a significant improvement over the approximation ratio of the existing truthful mechanism for GAP.
INTRODUCTION
We analyze the generalized assignment problem (GAP) in an environment where valuations are private information of distributed decision makers. In GAP, a set of m items has to be assigned to a set of n bins. Each bin associates a different value and weight to each item and has a limited capacity. An allocation may assign each bin a subset of items not exceeding the capacity of the bin. For each of these subsets, the valuation is additive in the values of items contained in the subset.
Ronen 2007). In order to resolve the clash between approximation and truthfulness, the maximalin-distributional-range (MIDR) allocation rules are introduced.
The MIDR allocation rule is the only known general approach for designing randomized truthful mechanisms in non-Bayesian settings. In Bayesian settings in which the probability distributions of the valuations are publicly known, random sampling methods have been successfully implemented in mechanism design problems (Alaei 2014; Hartline et al. 2011 ). An MIDR algorithm fixes a set of distributions over feasible solutions (the distributional range) independently of the valuations reported by the self-interested players, and outputs a random sample from the distribution that maximizes expected (reported) welfare (Dobzinski and Dughmi 2009 ). The best option for a mechanism designer is to devise a MIDR allocation rule providing an approximation of the optimal social welfare that (very closely) matches the best approximation guarantee known for the problem for which the underlying data are publicly known. Finding this type of MIDR allocation rules or designing an approximation truthful mechanism is not always possible. Several authors have shown that it is in general impossible to achieve the same approximation factor in truthful mechanisms (Lavi et al. 2003; Papadimitriou et al. 2008; Dobzinski and Vondrák 2013; Dughmi and Vondrák 2015; Dobzinski and Vondrák 2012) .
Looking more closely at the approximation algorithms known for GAP, we observe that no existing algorithm can serve as a MIDR allocation rule, although GAP without incentives has been studied extensively in the literature. Chekuri and Khanna (2005) explicitly state that the algorithm of Shmoys and Tardos (1993) can be adapted to provide a 2-approximation. Later, Fleischer et al. (2006) improved the factor to 1 − 1/e. Using a reduction to submodular maximization subject to a matroid constraint, Calinescu et al. (2011) achieved a ratio of 1 − 1/e − o(1) without using the ellipsoid method, which was pivotal in the work done by Fleischer et al. (2006) . An algorithm due to Feige and Vondrak (2006) yields an approximation factor of 1 − 1/e + ρ, ρ ≈ 10 −180 , which is the best known approximation ratio for GAP. Chakrabarty and Goel (2010) provide the best-known hardness result showing it is NP-hard to approximate GAP to any factor better than 10/11. According to our observations, all foregoing approximation algorithms comprise two algorithms: a relaxation algorithm and a rounding algorithm. In order to devise truthful mechanisms, Dughmi et al. (2011a) propose an approach which optimizes directly over the outcome of the rounding algorithm, rather than on the outcome of the relaxation algorithm. Since the rounding procedure is embedded into the objective function, this approach is not always computationally tractable. Assuming the optimization problem is convex, and the rounding scheme is independent of bidders' valuations, this approach always leads to a MIDR algorithm and is referred to as convex rounding. Lavi and Swamy (2011) propose a framework for deriving MIDR mechanisms from linear programming relaxations. They solve the relaxed problem in the first step, and then use a special rounding method (randomized meta-rounding (Carr and Vempala 2000) ) to obtain a random integral allocation. Although Lavi and Swamy also use the common composition of relaxation and rounding algorithms, their special rounding procedure produces an expected allocation which is always identical to the scaled down input of the rounding algorithm, component-wise. Of interest, the rounding procedure used by Lavi and Swamy guarantees truthfulness in expectation. Designing truthful mechanisms using the framework of Lavi and Swamy for a given problem is straightforward; however, this type of mechanism is slow in practice and requires many black-box invocations of an existing approximation algorithm for the problem. Very recently, Azar et al. (2015) present a truthful-in-expectation 1/2-approximation algorithm for GAP with private values using the framework proposed by Lavi and Swamy and a new rounding technique.
GAP is quite related to the combinatorial auctions with budget-additive bidders also known as maximum budgeted allocation (MBA) problem (Chakrabarty and Goel 2010) . In MBA, given a set of m indivisible items and n bidders, each bidder i is willing to pay b i j for item j, and has a maximum overall budget of B i . The goal is to allocate items to bidders to maximize revenue. The difference between MBA and GAP is that in GAP capacity constraints are rigid, while in MBA the budget constraints cap the revenue. The mechanism design problem with budget-additive assumes bidders' overall budgets as well as their willingness to pay for each item are private, and thus this mechanism design problem seems harder than the strategic GAP that we study in this article. For this problem, the best-known approximation ratio is O ( log m)-approximation (Dobzinski 2016) . GAP can also be viewed as a special case of a submodular maximization problem. In particular, Calinescu et al. (2011) cast GAP as a special case of submodular function maximization subject to a partition matroid, and provide a (1 − 1/e − O (1))-approximation ratio for GAP.
GAP has also been studied in mechanism design without money. Dughmi and Ghosh (2010) as well as Chen et al. (2013) studied GAP in a payment-free environment in which items are held by strategic agents. Given the high scarcity of truthful mechanisms in payment-free environments, in their setting the only strategic behavior of the bidders is to show or hide their values for items, but the values (if reported) are assumed to be public or verifiable. In designing mechanisms without money for GAP, in contrast to mechanism design with quasi-linear valuations, it is significant that the items, or the bins are held by strategic agents. Fadaei and Bichler (2017) studied GAP in a payment-free environment in which the bins are held by strategic agents.
Results and Techniques
It is possible to use the framework developed by Lavi and Swamy (2011) to design a truthful-inexpectation 1/2-approximation mechanism for GAP; in order to guarantee an improved approximation ratio as well as a higher performance, we follow the convex rounding technique. The main challenge in using convex rounding is to design an appropriate rounding scheme which induces a convex optimization problem. Moreover, the rounding scheme should return a feasible solution achieving a good approximation of the fractional value.
We design a rounding algorithm with the desired properties for GAP. Using the rounding algorithm to obtain a MIDR allocation rule, we directly optimize over the outcome of the rounding procedure rather than over the outcome of the relaxation algorithm. Using this technique, we formulate GAP as a convex optimization problem where the objective function equals the expected value of the rounding procedure. In contrast to Dughmi et al. (2011a) , our rounding algorithm uses some information from bidders' valuations. Our design does not violate the truthfulness since we use bidders' values solely to search for the optimum in a subset of the range containing the optimal solution, as explained in Section 5. This design can be viewed as a novel application of the convex rounding technique.
We supplement the allocation rule with a payment rule which allows the guarantee of nonnegativity of payments and individual rationality, ex post rather than providing these important properties only ex ante.
The approximation ratio of our mechanism very closely matches the best approximation ratio known for GAP with publicly known valuations. In particular, the proposed convex program provides 1 − 1/e ratio of optimum while the best-known approximation ratio of non-truthful algorithms is 1 − 1/e + ρ, ρ ≈ 10 −180 .
In order to solve the convex program, we present a fractional local search algorithm which approximates the proposed convex optimization problem within an arbitrarily small error, in the sense of an FPTAS. This leads to an approximate MIDR allocation rule. We let m and n denote the number of items and bins, respectively.
A Truthful Mechanism for the Generalized Assignment Problem 14:5 Theorem 1.1. There is a (1 − ϵ )-MIDR allocation rule that achieves a (1 − 1/e − ϵ )-approximation to the social welfare of the generalized assignment problem, for every ϵ = 1/poly(n). Dughmi et al. (2011b) show how to transform an approximately MIDR allocation rule to an approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism (see Definition 2.3). With this black-box transformation, we obtain the following. Theorem 1.2. There is a (1 − ϵ )-truthful-in-expectation mechanism that achieves a (1 − 1/e − ϵ )-approximation to the social welfare of the generalized assignment problem, for every ϵ = 1/poly(m, n).
From an algorithmic point of view, the proposed algorithm has advantages over the previously known optimization algorithms for GAP in terms of runtime and simplicity. We do not employ the ellipsoid method, which is identified as pivotal in the work of Fleischer et al. (2006) . Our algorithm improves on the one proposed by Calinescu et al. (2011) . In each iteration of the algorithm by Calinescu et al. (2011) , a random sampling is required to compute the residual increase of assigning an item to a bin which subsequently increases runtime. The residual increase is treated as an approximate evaluation of the gradient of the objective function at a point. This residual increase is in fact calculated by taking an average of (mn) 5 independent samples. We use a novel objective function which is specified exactly, rather than by random sampling, whereby it is possible to explicitly calculate the gradient of the objective function which helps to simplify the algorithm and improve the runtime. It should be noted that in our design, we benefited from the ideas developed in Fleischer et al. (2006) , Calinescu et al. (2011), and Dughmi et al. (2011b) .
Paper Structure
In Section 2, we introduce necessary notation and definitions used throughout the article. In Section 3 and Section 4 we present the MIDR allocation rule and the payment rule, respectively, for the setting where bins are held by strategic bidders. Section 5 explains why the proposed mechanism is truthful. The required modification of the mechanism for the case where items are held by bidders is explained in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude with a summary and a discussion about future research questions.
PRELIMINARIES
In the generalized assignment problem, there are n bins, I , and m items, J . We let v i j denote the value of bin i for item j. Each bin i has a different weight w i j for each item j and has a limited capacity C i . Let F i denote the collection of all feasible assignments to bin i (∀S ∈ F i : j ∈S w i j ≤ C i ). Each item may be assigned to at most one bin. In the final allocation, some items may remain unassigned.
We assume weights and capacities are publicly known, yet values of assigning items to bins are the private information of bidders. More formally, we assume values {v i j } i ∈I, j ∈J are the private information of bidders. In the following, we assume bins are held by bidders and thus each bidder i has private valuations {v i j } j ∈J . We analyze the case where items are held by bidders and each bidder j has private valuations {v i j } i ∈I in Section 6.
An allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ), where S i ⊆ J denotes the subset assigned to bin i, is feasible if ∀i ∈ I : S i ∈ F i and {S i } i ∈I are mutually disjoint. The valuation of bin i is defined as
With a slight abuse of notation, we sometimes use
The goal is to find a feasible allocation of maximum total social welfare.
In light of the revelation principle, we limit our attention to direct revelation mechanisms. Every mechanism has two main components: an allocation rule and a payment rule. The allocation rule A is a function which maps a reported valuation v = (v 1 , . . . ,v n ) to an allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ), where ∀i :
The payment rule is a function from reported valuations to a required payment from each bidder. Let p i denote the payment rule function for bidder i.
Definition 2.1 (MIDR Allocation Rule).
Given reported valuations v 1 , . . . ,v n , and a previously defined probability distribution over feasible sets R, a MIDR allocation rule returns an outcome sampled randomly from a distribution D * ∈ R that maximizes the expected welfare Dobzinski and Dughmi 2009 ).
Analogously, we define the (1 − ϵ )-MIDR allocation rule as follows.
Definition 2.2 ((1 − ϵ )-MIDR).
Given reported valuations v 1 , . . . ,v n , and a previously defined probability distribution over feasible sets R, a (1 − ϵ )-MIDR allocation rule returns an outcome sampled randomly from a distribution D * ∈ R that (1 − ϵ )-approximately maximizes the expected welfare
An approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism is defined as follows.
( 1) The expectation in Equation (1) is taken over the coin flips of the mechanism.
The goal of our work is to find an allocation and payment rule which constitute a truthful-inexpectation mechanism for GAP and approximates the social welfare as much as possible.
MIDR ALLOCATION RULE FOR GAP
To design a MIDR allocation rule, we first define a relaxed set of allocations. Next, we design a rounding procedure which returns a feasible integral solution for each point of the relaxed set. Finally, we find a point in the relaxed set whose rounded solution (the integral solution calculated using the rounding procedure) has the highest possible social welfare among all points of the relaxed set. That is, we optimize directly over the expected value of the allocation produced by a rounding algorithm.
More specifically, we let the relaxed feasible set be R as follows: given a vector x ∈ {0, 1} I ×2 J , let x i,S indicate whether subset S is assigned to bin i.
In R one randomized feasible set is assigned to each bin i. The sets assigned to different bins may overlap; however, in the rounding step each item is assigned only once. Our intent is to maximize the expected value of the rounded allocation over relaxed set R. This leads to a MIDR allocation rule, as explained in Section 5. Let us call the rounding algorithm r greedy . Algorithm 1 presents the desired MIDR algorithm.
Following is a step-by-step procedure to implement Algorithm 1 and a presentation of the benefits of the outcome of the algorithm. We start by explaining the rounding algorithm.
Greedy Rounding
We choose a rounding algorithm which preserves a good ratio of the fractional solution and returns a feasible allocation in which each item is assigned only once. We first define helper function ϕ (·) ALGORITHM 1: MIDR Allocation Rule for the Generalized Assignment Problem.
which maps a point in R to a point in [0, 1] 
The rounding procedure, defined as Algorithm 3, has two steps. In the first step, given a point x ∈ R the rounding procedure finds another point x ∈ R such that ∀i ∈ I , ∀j ∈ J : y i j = 1 − e −y i j , where y = ϕ (x ) and y = ϕ (x ). In the second step, the rounding procedure assigns subset S to bin i with probability x i,S while resolving conflicts as explained in Algorithm 3.
We propose Algorithm 2 to perform the first step. Algorithm 2 takes a point x ∈ R and a desired vector y ∈ [0, 1] I ×J , where y ϕ (x ) and returns another point x ∈ R such that y = ϕ (x ).
ALGORITHM 2: An Oblivious Method for Finding a Dominated Point in R.
Data: x ∈ R, and y
Algorithm 2 returns the desired outcome as confirmed by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose x ∈ R with polynomially many x i,S > 0, and y ∈ [0, 1] I ×J such that y ϕ (x ). If we call Algorithm 2 on x and y , it returns x ∈ R such that ϕ (x ) = y with only polynomially many x i,S > 0.
Proof. If the algorithm terminates, we will have ∀i ∈ I , ∀j ∈ J : δ i j = 0, and therefore y = ϕ (x ). Thus, we only need to show that the algorithm terminates in polynomial time and x has polynomially many positive components. We show the termination of the algorithm for one bin and one item and since the number of items and bins is polynomial, we obtain the desired conclusion.
Fix bin i and item j. We consider one iteration in which x i,S with j ∈ S is chosen. Two cases can occur. First, x i,S < δ i j . In this case, the number of positive components in x does not increase, since x i,S becomes zero and at most another positive component is added: x i,S \{j } . This case can occur as many times as the number of x i,S :j ∈S > 0, which are polynomially many by assumption.
Second, x i,S ≥ δ i j . In this case, only one new positive component may be added: x i,S \{j } . However, this case can happen only once for item j, as δ i j becomes zero in this step.
Thus, in total for bin i and item j, only one new positive component might be included in x compared to x and the number of iterations is polynomial. This completes the proof.
Thus, for the first step of the rounding algorithm, we call Algorithm 2 on inputs x and y ∈ [0, 1] I ×J where ∀i ∈ I , ∀j ∈ J : y i j = 1 − e −y i j and y = ϕ (x ), to obtain the desired point in R. Notice, that y y, as needed by Algorithm 2. The following is a presentation of the greedy rounding algorithm, r greedy .
ALGORITHM 3: Greedy Rounding Algorithm, r greedy .
Data: x ∈ R with polynomially many
Invoke Algorithm 2 with x and y as the inputs and let x be the result. 2. Assign set S to i with probability x i,S independently for each bin i. If some item j is assigned to more than one bin, assign it to the bin among those bins with the maximum value v i j . Let S i be the set assigned to bin i.
In order to analyze the performance of the rounding algorithm, we define a new function.
where σ j : I → I is a permutation on I such that v σ j (i ), j is decreasing (non-increasing) when i runs from 1 to n, and v σ j (n+1), j = 0.
Function F (·) is useful in explaining the quality of the rounding algorithm. In particular, F (ϕ (x )) defines the expected value produced by the rounding procedure at each point x ∈ R. This is shown by the following lemma.
Proof. Assume x ∈ R. Let x be the outcome of Step 1 of Algorithm 3. Let y = ϕ (x ) and y = ϕ (x ). We calculate the expected value achieved from the assignment of item j in the integral allocation.
Fix item j. For simplicity, we assume that σ j (i) = i. This means that bins with smaller indices have higher valuations for j. We find the expected value returned from item j; for other items, the argument is similar. With probability y 1j the set assigned to bin 1 contains j, thus j is assigned to 1. Recall that y 1j = S :j ∈S x 1,S . Therefore, with probability y 1j , the value of returned allocation is v 1j . With probability (1 − y 1j )y 2j the set assigned to bin 1 does not contain the item but the set assigned to bin 2 contains the item and therefore item j is assigned to bin 2. This case leads to a returned value of (1 − y 1j )y 2j v 2j .
Continuing in a similar manner for other bins, the achievable expected value becomes y 1j v 1j account that y i j = 1 − e −y i j , by summing over all items we obtain the desired conclusion, using linearity of expectation.
Therefore, we need to optimize F (ϕ (x )) over x ∈ R. Optimizing F (ϕ (x )) over x ∈ R is essentially the same as optimizing F (y) over y ∈ P, where
As a result, what remains is to explain how to solve max y ∈P F (y), and the quality of the solution.
The Approximation Ratio
Let us denote the optimal solution to GAP as OPT . We show the quality of our method by comparing max y ∈P F (y) with the optimal solution to the configuration LP of GAP (GAP-CLP). We notice that the optimal solution to GAP-CLP provides an upper bound to OPT . The configuration LP of GAP is as follows:
To be able to compare GAP-CLP to F (y), we first introduce a new variable into the program and then rearrange the objective function. Let y ∈ [0, 1] I ×J be such that ∀i ∈ I , ∀j ∈ J : y i j = S ∈F i :j ∈S x i,S . Using this new variable we define polytope P as follows:
We notice that P ⊆ P since P has an additional constraint (Constraint 1). We rearrange the objective function of GAP-CLP to be a function of items (y) rather than subsets (x).
Consequently, solving GAP-CLP is equivalent to finding max y ∈P i ∈I, j ∈J v i j y i j . We are now ready to compare max y ∈P F (y) with the optimal integral solution to the GAP (denoted by OPT ). 
The first inequality holds since P ⊆ P. The last inequality holds because max y ∈P i ∈I, j ∈J v i j y i j ≥ OPT . For the second inequality, consider item j and y ∈ P . For simplicity, we assume ∀i : σ j (i) = i. We have n i=1 y i j ≤ 1, since y ∈ P . Considering the fact that 1 − e −x ≥ (1 − 1 e )x for x ∈ [0, 1], we obtain
Summing both sides, we obtain
Obtaining this inequality for all items then, and summing them up, we obtain the desired conclusion.
Thus, what remains is to show how to maximize F (y) over y ∈ P, the topic of Section 3.3.
Solving the Convex Optimization Problem
We wish to solve max y ∈P F (y) which is essentially equivalent to the following mathematical optimization problem:
First, we show that GAP-CP is a convex optimization problem. All constraints in the program are linear, thus we only need to show that the objective function, F (y), is concave/convex as shown by the following theorem. convex program. Nevertheless, we are able to implement a (1 − ϵ )-MIDR allocation rule, for any ϵ = 1/poly(n).
Our method belongs to the class of conditional gradient methods (a.k.a. Frank-Wolfe methods) which is appropriate for solving constrained convex optimization problems. The conditional gradient method maximizes a linear approximation of the objective function subject to the original constraints, in each iteration. Then, it moves with a small step toward this maximizer where the size of the step is chosen carefully. The advantage of this method is that in each step a linear programming problem needs to be solved, and by convexity the solutions always stay in the polytope, and thus no projection operator onto the feasible polytope is needed. This type of methods has been successfully implemented in several submodular maximization problems starting with the seminal work of Vondrák (2008) .
To be more specific, our algorithm in each iteration, when the current solution is y , considers ∇F (y ) as the cost vector of the linear programming that must be solved in the iteration. 1 Thus, in each iteration we solve max y ∈P y · ∇F (y ), i.e., the linear programming approximation of the convex program at point y . According to Proposition 3.5, maximizing y · v over all y ∈ P for every cost function v, is equivalent to finding set S * i ∈ F i for every bin i which maximizes j ∈S *
The first equality holds since for every y ∈ P, there exists x ∈ R where y = ϕ (x ). The last equality holds since if x ∈ R, then S ∈F i x i,S ≤ 1. Finding max{ j ∈S v i j : S ∈ F i } is essentially solving a knapsack subproblem for bin i. To do so, we invoke the FPTAS for the knapsack problem. We say for any v i = (v i j ) j ∈J and 0 < ϵ < 1,
We store the computed vector in each iteration in a set Z. We keep the size of Z to be of at most 1 δ ; δ will be defined later. As long as |Z| < 1 δ we simply add the current vector to Z. When |Z| = 1 δ , in each iteration we add the current vector and remove one vector from Z which has the least value with respect to the current gradient. The solution returned by the algorithm, x, has the property that y = ϕ (x ) is a convex combination of the vectors in Z: y = δ · z ∈Z z. We continue updating Z until the increase in F (y) is below a predefined threshold. Now, we are ready to present the main algorithm. Let M denote max{v i j : i ∈ I ; j ∈ J }.
Lemma 3.6. Algorithm 4 produces a solution x such that x ∈ R.
Proof. We observe that the set Z contains at most 1 δ elements; as long as |Z| < 1 δ , one element z is included into the set and when |Z| = 1 δ , one element is added and one element is removed from the set. 1 We remind the reader that ∇F , the gradient of F, is a vector whose coordinates are the first partial derivatives (1) 
Proof. Assume x is the outcome of Algorithm 4. According to Lemma 3.6, x ∈ R. Let y = ϕ (x ). Let z be the calculated vector in the last iteration in Step 2, i.e., (z − y) · ∇F (y) ≤ ϵM.
Let y * = arg max y ∈P F (y). According to Proposition 3.5, z · ∇F (y) ≥ (1 − ϵ ) max w ∈P w · ∇F (y). Hence, z · ∇F (y) ≥ (1 − ϵ )y * · ∇F (y). Thus, we get
The first inequality is because of the concavity of F . The second inequality is by rearranging and using inequality z · ∇F (y) ≥ (1 − ϵ )y * · ∇F (y). The third inequality holds since (z − y) · ∇F (y) ≤ ϵM, and y · ∇F (y)
, and therefore Lemma 3.7 holds. Now, using ϵ =
Hence, when Algorithm 4 terminates F (y) ≥ (1 − o(1))F (y * ), the desired conclusion.
The change in y in each iteration is either δz or δ (z − z min ) for |Z| < 1 δ and |Z| = 1 δ , respectively. The change in gradient, however, has a certain upper bound when y changes by a certain amount, as Lemma 3.8 shows.
Lemma 3.8. For any y and y with ||y − y || ∞ ≤ δ and any i and j,
Proof. Consider the gradient of F . For simplicity, we assume that σ j (i) = i.
Considering l k=1 y k j ≤ n k=1 y k j + nδ and from Equation (2) . This completes the proof.
The following lemma is useful in showing the progress of the algorithm.
Lemma 3.9. For any y and y with ||y − y || ∞ ≤ δ ,
Proof. Let y − y = z + − z − where for all i and j, 0 ≤ z + i j ≤ δ and 0 ≤ z − i j ≤ δ . From Lemma 3.8, z + · ∇F (y ) ≥ e −nδ z + · ∇F (y) and z − · ∇F (y ) ≤ e nδ z − · ∇F (y). From these inequalities and using inequalities e −x ≥ 1 − x and e x ≤ 1 + 2x for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and δ < 1/n, we get
The last inequality holds because for every z ∈ [0, 1] I ×J , z · ∇F (y) ≤ nmM. This is true since for any y, we have ∂F ∂y i j ≤ M and in the best possible case for z, every bin packs the m items and produces a value of mM. This completes the proof. Lemma 3.10. In each iteration, the value of F (y) increases by at least ϵ 2 12mn 2 M. Proof. As long as the algorithm continues we have (z − y) · ∇F (y) > ϵM. First, we consider the case where |Z| < 1 δ . We have
The first inequality is because of the concavity of F . The second inequality holds because of Lemma 3.8. The third inequality is because (z − y) · ∇F (y) > ϵM implies that z · ∇F (y) > ϵM, as we always have ∇F (y) ≥ 0. Now, using δ = ϵ 6mn 2 , we obtain
Second, we consider the case where |Z| = 1 δ . We have
The first inequality is because of the concavity of F . The second inequality holds because of Lemma 3.9. The third inequality is because (z − z min ) · ∇F (y) ≥ (z − y) · ∇F (y), as shown in the following.
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By definition of z min , z min · ∇F (y) ≤ z · ∇F (y) for all z ∈ Z. Thus, |Z| · z min · ∇F (y) ≤ z ∈Z z · ∇F (y), which in turn means z min · ∇F (y) ≤ y · ∇F (y). Observe that y = δ · z ∈Z z . Now, using δ = ϵ 6mn 2 , we obtain
This completes the proof.
Lemma 3.11. After at most 12m 2 n 2 /ϵ 2 iterations, Algorithm 4 terminates.
Proof. Since M denotes max{v i j : i ∈ I ; j ∈ J }, mM is an upper bound for max y ∈P F (y). Recall that
Based on Lemma 3.10, in each iteration the growth in value is at least ϵ 2 12mn 2 M; Algorithm 4 thus in at most 12m 2 n 2 /ϵ 2 iterations, reaches the value of mM, which is an upper bound on the best solution. This concludes the proof.
We thus achieve a (1 − ϵ )-MIDR allocation rule that runs in polynomial time. This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.1.
Simplifying the Rounding Procedure
As we note, it is possible to simplify the rounding procedure (Algorithm 3), further. The simplified rounding is as follows. Given x ∈ R, let y = ϕ (x ). We assign set S to each bin i independently with probability x i,S . Next, for each item j we do as follows. If item j is assigned to bin i, we let the bin hold the item with probability to make sure that the probability of assigning item j to bin i is not y i j but 1 − e −y i j which is necessary to maintain the MIDR property. According to the MIDR principle, the expected value of the randomized integral assignment should be equal to the calculated fractional value. Finally, if some item j is assigned to more than one bin, we assign it to the bin among those bins with the maximum value v i j .
In order to use the allocation rule algorithm (Algorithm 1) as an optimization algorithm, one can employ a simpler rounding algorithm. The simpler rounding requires only Step 2 of Algorithm 3. For an optimization purpose, there is no need to also execute Step 1 of Algorithm 3. Thus, after finding a fractional solution x by invoking Algorithm 4, we assign set S to each bin i with probability x i,S and resolve conflicts according to the technique explained in Algorithm 3. This improves the runtime for the optimization purpose.
COMPUTING PAYMENTS
Supplementing the MIDR allocation rule of Section 3 with VCG payments yields a truthful-inexpectation mechanism. We compute payments in order to also enforce non-negativity of payments and individual rationality, ex post.
To compute the VCG fractional payment p frac i for bidder i, we need to compute two components: first, the Clarke pivot, h i (v −i ), which is the best achievable social welfare by bidders other than i, and second, the value gained by bidders other than bidder i in the current fractional solution. We can calculate h i (v −i ) by rewriting GAP-CP for the market without bidder i, i.e., v i j = 0 for all j. To compute the value gained by other bidders in the fractional allocation, F −i (y * ), we set ∀j ∈ J : v i j = 0 in F (y * ), assuming that y * is the outcome of Algorithm 4. Function F (y) is explicitly known to us and we can set in it v i j to 0. Finally, Now, assume y * 1 = (0.6, 0.3) and y * 2 = (0.4, 0.7). Then,
The value gained by bidder i in the fractional allocation is therefore w
Assuming that S i is the subset assigned to bidder i by the rounding procedure, similar to Lavi and Swamy (2011) , we can compute the randomized payment for bidder i, p i , satisfying individual rationality and non-negativity of payments as follows.
We remark that since we provide only an approximation solution to the convex optimization problem, truthfulness and individual rationality are as a result approximate with a high probability of 1 − 1/poly(m, n).
TRUTHFULNESS
We need to show that our allocation rule is MIDR. The previous applications of the convex rounding technique benefited from rounding algorithms which are oblivious, i.e., independent of bidders' valuations (Dughmi et al. (2011a) and Dughmi (2011) ). In those applications, it is easy to see that the range over which the allocation rule optimizes, i.e., the image of the rounding algorithm, is independent of valuations, and thus their allocation rule is obviously a MIDR algorithm. In our case, however, the rounding algorithm is not oblivious and uses some information from valuations. Thus, we need to argue why our allocation rule can still serve as a MIDR algorithm. To do so, we describe the distributional range of allocations over which the allocation rule optimizes social welfare to optimality. By the definition of MIDR allocation rules, the range of allocations has to be chosen before any valuation has been seen.
Let Π denote the set of all permutations on bins. The rounding algorithm (Algorithm 3) actually works with a specific permutation on bins for each item. In particular, the rounding algorithm uses σ j for each item j which reorders the bins in decreasing order of their values for item j. We recall that σ j is formally defined in Section 3.1.
We can look at the rounding algorithm as a function which takes the permutation π j for each item j as input. Let us call this parameterized rounding algorithm r and define it as Algorithm 5.
ALGORITHM 5: Rounding Algorithm, r . Data: x ∈ R, π j ∈ Π for each item j. Result: Feasible allocation (S 1 , . . . , S n ). 1. Let y = ϕ (x ). Let y ∈ [0, 1] I ×J be such that y i j = 1 − e −y i j . Invoke Algorithm 2 with x and y as the inputs and let x be the result. 2. Independently for each bin i, assign set S to i with probability x i,S . If some item j is assigned to more than one bin, then assign item j to the bin among those bins that precedes others in π j . return (S 1 , . . . , S n ).
Algorithm 3 thus can be rewritten as r greedy (x ) = r (x, σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ m ). For each point x ∈ R, r (x, π 1 , . . . , π m ) rounds point x to an integer point by taking into account permutation π j ∈ Π for each item j. We let the domain of function r comprise all x ∈ R as well as all π j ∈ Π, ∀j ∈ J . The range of function r then is the range over which our allocation algorithm optimizes the social welfare. Formally, we define the range as follows.
The range is clearly independent of private values as it only takes into account points x and the permutations. Maximizing over this range defines a maximal in distributional range algorithm. In order to maximize over the range we do not need to search the full range. Rather, it suffices to look for the maximum only in the part of the range containing the maximum.
We utilize this fact in our MIDR allocation rule. In particular, in Algorithm 1 we maximize r (x, σ 1 , . . . , σ m ) over x ∈ R. There is no need to take into account other permutations since the value of r (x, σ 1 , . . . , σ m ) is always as high as that of r (x, π 1 , . . . , π m ) where at least for one j, π j σ j . To rephrase, maximizing r (x, σ 1 , . . . , σ m ) over x ∈ R is equivalent to maximizing r (x, π 1 , . . . , π m ) over x ∈ R for all π j ∈ Π, j ∈ J . This is true because for each item j when there is a tie (Step 2 of Algorithm 5) assigning the item to the bin with the highest value for the item, obviously produces a higher value. To the best our knowledge, this is the first time that such an observation has been used for maximizing over a range.
WHEN ITEMS ARE HELD BY BIDDERS
Here, we mention the required modifications for the case where items are held by bidders rather than the bins. Such bidders are called unit-demand bidders. To better expose the changes we index bidders by j in the following. Allocation rule A takes reported valuations v = (v 1 , . . . ,v m ), v j = (v i j ) i ∈I for all j ∈ J , and assigns each item j to one bin, or leaves the item unassigned. Let p j denote the payment rule function for bidder j.
Definition 6.1 (Truthful-in-Expectation) . A mechanism is truthful-in-expectation for GAP (when items are held by bidders) if, for every bidder j, (true) valuation function v j , (reported) valuation function v j , and (reported) valuation functions v −j of the other bidders,
The expectation in Equation (3) is taken over the coin flips of the mechanism.
For this type of bidders, we maximize over the range defined in Section 5 to obtain a MIDR allocation rule. That is, we use Algorithm 1 as the allocation rule. We need, however, a different payment rule for this type of bidders.
In order to calculate VCG fractional payment p frac j , we need to calculate Clarke pivot h j (v −j ) and the value gained by bidders other than j in the current fractional solution, F −j (y * ). We calculate h j (v −j ) by running Algorithm 4 after evaluating v i j to 0 for all i ∈ I . Also, we have F −j (y * ) = = F (y * ) − F −j (y * ) and assuming that item j is assigned to bin i in the rounded solution, the payment of bidder j is calculated as follows. 
CONCLUSION
We studied the problem of mechanism design for a strategic variant of GAP where valuations are assumed to be private information known only to the bidders while weights and capacities are publicly known. Given that GAP is NP-hard, and that VCG is not trivially truthful with suboptimal solutions, we resorted to approximation mechanisms. We proposed a solution by which the two obstacles, maximizing the social welfare of GAP as well as extracting true valuations of bidders, are surmounted. The solution provides bidders with incentives to report their valuations truthfully and runs in polynomial time approximating the social welfare with a provable ratio of at least 1 − 1/e. In comparison to the existing approximation algorithms for GAP without incentive issues, our proposed algorithm has advantages in terms of runtime and simplicity while presenting the same approximation ratio. Our work also shows that the convex rounding technique is a powerful machinery for designing truthful approximation mechanisms and might find other applications in the field.
We notice that the proposed solution also extends to a more general strategic setting in which each bidder k has her own valuation v i j for each bin i and item j, and the social welfare sums all bidders' values for each i and j. The approximation ratio as well as concavity of the optimization problem continue to hold since we can define an accumulative valuation V i j = k v ki j for each bin i and item j, and all arguments follow for this new valuation. For truthfulness, if every bidder is certain that the allocation rule is MIDR the mechanism will be truthful. This can be certified if, similar to our rounding procedure, in case of a tie for an item, we break the tie in favor of the bin whose accumulative value is the highest among all competing bins for the item.
Another observation is that set F i , the collection of feasible bundles of items for bin i, need not only be the set satisfying the knapsack constraints, but can be any collection of bundles which satisfy the following two properties. First, F i has to be downward closed. That is, if S ∈ F i , then for all S ⊂ S, we have S ∈ F i . Second, the optimization subproblem max{ j ∈S v i j : S ∈ F i } can be solved exactly, or there is an FPTAS for this subproblem.
A problem which remains to be solved is the analysis of the strategic version of GAP in which weights and capacities are also private. We conjecture there is no constant ratio truthful mechanism for this problem. Another problem to be solved is to find a truthful mechanism for GAP with private values which stipulates that no item in the final allocation may remain unassigned.
